This paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the German states. The results show that in former West Germany rightwing governments promoted economic freedom, whereas leftwing governments confined it. In former East Germany, however, rightwing governments have not been associated with propagating economic freedom. This finding appears to conflict with the common notion of policy convergence at the federal level. In fact, the observed variation in political preferences across states may indicate that politicians gratify the local electorate and, in return, offer moderate policies at the federal level.
Introduction
An intriguing question in Political Economy is how government ideology influences economic policy-making. Leftwing and rightwing governments have different preferences as to the size and scope of government and, thus, on economic policy. Leftwing governments favor more state intervention, more income redistribution, and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In contrast, rightwing governments believe in the free market and thus favor less state intervention in the economy. This alignment of government ideology and economic policy-making has given rise to the partisan theories (Hibbs 1977 , Alesina 1987 .
Political parties in office do, however, not always implement economic policies that are in line with the predictions of the partisan approach, maybe because of the large diversity of opinion prevailing in modern catch-all parties. In a similar vein, policy positions of an individual party sometimes conflict with each other. The political right, for example, needs to bridge the divide between market-oriented views in economic policy and social conservatism (see, for example, Chakravarty 2008). Governments sometimes even implement policies that appear to contradict their political ideology. In the United States, for example, the Reagan administration presided over a massive increase of the government deficit which the leftwing government under President Clinton subsequently tried to reverse. In the United Kingdom, contrary to public perception, Labour was not a party for the poor during the second post-war Labour period (Beckerman 1972) , and Prime Minister Blair implemented market-oriented reforms. Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) have argued ("When does it take a Nixon go to China?") that leftwing governments may well have more political credibility to convince the electorate of market-oriented reforms in economic policy. It thus remains an empirical question as to how government ideology influences economic policy-making.
In order to investigate empirically how government ideology has influenced economic policy-making, scholars have used cross-country data as well as panel data and time series for individual countries (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997 , Bjørnskov 2008 , Broz 2011 . A problem with cross-country analysis is that institutional characteristics differ across countries. A country study avoids this problem. The inferences drawn from such a case study can then be transferred to other countries endowed with similar institutions.
Germany is a particularly interesting case for various reasons. First, many observers believe that party and policy polarization between the dominant parties in Germany, the leftwing Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU), have nearly disappeared. Some empirical studies suggest that government ideology has indeed not played a substantial role in German economic policy at the federal level (e.g, de Haan and Zelhorst 1993 , Berger and Woitek 1997a , Koester 2009 , Potrafke 2009 , 2012 . 2 In the German states (Laender), government ideology also does not appear to have systematically influenced overall government expenditures, public debt, and revenues; the empirical evidence is however rather mixed (e.g., Seitz 2000 , Jochimsen and Nuscheler 2011 , Berger and Holler 2007 , Schneider 2007 , Rodden 2001 . Government ideology has, on the other hand, influenced the composition of the government budget (e.g., Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007, Potrafke 2011) . Rightwing governments spent somewhat more on universities than leftwing governments, whereas leftwing governments spent more on schooling. 3 This spending pattern appears to be in line with the preferences of the governing parties' constituencies. The clientele of leftist parties profit relatively little from public expenditures on higher education but more from public expenditures on lower education. In a similar vein, rightwing governments spent more on culture. This result reflects their constituencies´ appreciation of theatres, operas and art exhibitions, which contrast with the leisure preferences of the blue collar workers, the traditional constituency of the leftist parties 2 Belke (1996 Belke ( , 2000 examines partisan cycles on unemployment and inflation, Vaubel (1997a Vaubel ( , 1997b and Woitek (1997b, 2005) investigate monetary partisan cycles in Germany. Politicians do not directly have an influence on monetary policy aggregates, due to institutional restrictions, most notably central bank independence. In any event, government ideology has an influence on appointments to the council of the central bank. A political party may tend to nominate council members with political preferences similar to its own (Vaubel 1993 (Vaubel , 1997a . The nominated council members, in turn, may be loyal to the party which has appointed them (Goehlmann and Vaubel 2007) . 3 Schulze's (2008) (Karabegovic et al. 2003) . To be sure, the economic freedom index for the German states also includes the entire direct tax burden, although the German Laender are not autonomous in setting tax rates. The reason is that an economic freedom index excluding tax burden and taxes' distortionary effects appears to be less significant. Fuest et al. (2009: 10) therefore conclude that their index illustrates how economic freedom differs across states given the policy interaction of the federal and state level. Federal tax policies influence the Laender in the same manner. I will thus focus on the cross-state variation in my empirical analysis. In any event, in the robustness tests section I will also discuss results when the tax components (and public investment) are ignored.
The K-index is based on the following ten sub-indicators: 
The German political party landscape
Two major political parties have dominated the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Bavaria, Germany's largest federal state by area, the conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The CDU and the CSU do not compete against each other; they form one faction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). This is why I label both as CDU in the empirical analysis. All federal chancellors and Prime ministers in the states of the last decades were members of one of these two major blocs, SPD and CDU. Therefore, one can test for ideology-induced effects on this left-right dimension.
The much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have played an important role as coalition partners in West Germany. While the SPD has formed coalitions with all the other three parties, the CDU never formed a coalition with the Greens on the federal or state level during the period analyzed in this paper. In the former Eastern states, the socialist party (former PDS, since 2007 "DIE LINKE") has played an important role. The
Socialists have formed a coalition with the Social Democrats in Berlin and MecklenburgWestern Pomerania. I will also consider the influence of the different coalition types, because the left-right dimension may neglect ideological differences between government parties within a "camp" (e.g. for the Left between SPD/FDP, SPD/GR and SPD/LINKE coalitions).
As minority governments and other government formations have played a negligible role, they will be subsumed under the coalition types mentioned above.
Correlation between economic freedom and government ideology
In order to illustrate the association between government ideology and economic freedom, I
present correlations between the averaged economic freedom indices and averaged government ideology.
The differences between leftist and rightwing governments will be tested on the leftright scale using the variable "Left" as well as different coalition type variables respectively.
These variables assume values between zero and one and describe the share of leftwing governments or the respective coalition type over five our four years. I relate the average of government ideology over the last five or four years before period t to the economic freedom indices in period t. For example, the economic freedom index in 1970 is assigned to the average share of leftwing governments in the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 . As the availability of the economic freedom indices changes from a five year to a four year interval after 1990, the economic freedom index in 1994, for example, is assigned to the average share of leftwing governments in the years 1991 , 1992 , 1993 and 1994 
Econometric analysis 3.1 Econometric model
The baseline panel data model has the following form: Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator. However, the ideology-induced effects are much more pronounced when the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator and the t-statistics of the ideology variables somewhat decrease with more repetitions of the bootstrapped standard errors.
Basic Results
columns (1) and (2). The fixed state and fixed period effects turn out to be jointly significant at the 1% level.
The results in Table 1 show that rightwing governments have been more active in promoting economic freedom: the coefficient of the variable "Left" has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (3). The numerical meaning of the coefficient in column (1) is that a corresponding increase of the Bavaria under the pure CDU governments. These two effects also explain convincingly why the variable "Left" does not turn out to be statistically significant. The different results in columns (2) and (4) display the sensitivity of the results to the fairly small sample and the reduced sample due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
Robustness Checks
I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 may suffer from omitted variable bias. I have therefore included further (economic) control variables.
A typical feature of Germany's fiscal federalism is the fiscal equalization system, which harmonizes revenues across states. Transfer payments circulate from the federal level to the states (vertical) as well as between the states (horizontal). Since 1995, the New German
Laender have participated in the system, so that the volume of payments has increased.
Moreover, the German states are of two different types: the budgets of city-states cover additional expenditures and revenues which are administered by local authorities in non-city states. Fuest et al. (2009: 10) discuss that the horizontal fiscal equalization is likely to influence economic freedom across the German states. When states spend transfers, economic freedom will decrease because states need to increase revenues in order to finance the transfers. When states receive transfers, economic freedom will decrease because governments can give more subsidies and intervene the market.
I have included two variables that address the horizontal fiscal equalization system and consider the real amount of money, which the individual state received or spent. In accordance with the coding of the ideology variables I have aggregated the annual transfer payment to five and four year averages. Table 3 shows that transfers received have negatively influenced economic freedom (L-Index). The variable "Fiscal equalization (transfers received)" is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (3) and (4) 8 Data for GDP are available from 1970 onwards. In order to achieve real GDP per capita, I divide these data by total population and deflate the data by the German consumer price index at the federal level. Table 4 shows the regression results using the IV estimator. Applying this estimator, results are similar to the ones in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The effect of the variable "Left" on the Lindex is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in columns (3) and (7). The coefficients of the unemployment rate in columns (1) and (2) have the expected negative signs but do not turn out statistically significant. The coefficients of GDP per capita growth in columns (3) and (4) have negative signs but also do not turn out to be statistically significant. The coefficients of GDP per capita in columns (5) to (8) variable that considers geographical neighbors. 10 The spatial weight matrix is rownormalized. I have estimated a spatial lag model using 2SLS and regressed the spatially weighted dependent variable on the explanatory and spatially weighted explanatory variables in the first stage. The spatially lagged dependent variables do not turn out to be statistically significant. Including them does not change the inferences regarding the coalition type ideology variables, yet the leftwing ideology variable lacks statistical significance when the spatially lagged dependent variable is included.
It is conceivable that including the initial level of economic freedom influences the inferences. For example, in the East the initial level of economic freedom is much lower than in the West (see Figure 3) . In a similar vein, with a low initial level of economic freedom, also leftwing governments may feel the need to increase economic freedom, less so when the level of economic freedom is already high. To test this conjecture, I have followed Sturm and de
Haan (2003) economic freedom becomes somewhat weaker when excluding Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hamburg. In contrast, the negative effect of leftist governments on economic freedom becomes stronger when excluding Bremen.
Conclusion
The Scholars may also want to investigate whether differences between party positions across the states influence economic policy-making. For example, the CDU in BadenWuerttemberg appears to be more conservative than the CDU in Hamburg. Studies on political ideology in the United States deal with regional party characteristics. The DW NOMINATE data on political positions in the US Congress by Poole and Rosenthal (1996) relax the assumption that members of specific parties hold the same ideological positions across the US states. An alternative to measure partisanship and political ideology is to use exit poll data (e.g., Larcinese et al. 2010) , which also allow taking into account ideological 12 On labor mobility and regional disparities in unemployment between East and West Germany see Niebuhr et al. (2011 Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
